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INTRODUCTION
American cities are on the march. Many city populations have stabilized
after a long decline, downtowns are thriving, and commentators celebrate the
city resurgent.1 In addition, cities are flexing their policy-making muscle.
Cities have been adopting ordinances in areas as diverse as environmental

* Perre Bowen Professor, Joseph C. Carter, Jr. Research Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law. Many thanks to Alexandra Hemmings for research assistance and to the
editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their excellent editorial suggestions.
1. See generally ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE
AMERICAN CITY (Vintage Books, eds. 2012); Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan,
Reversal of Fortunes? Lower-Income Urban Neighborhoods in the U.S. in the 1990s, 45 URB.
STUD. 845, 866 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the
Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275 (2006); Michael Storper & Michael Manville,
Behaviour, Preferences, and Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Resurgence, 43 URB. STUD.
1247 (2006).
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protection and health care and asserting themselves into policy spaces often
considered exclusive to the state or the federal governments.2
Despite this general shift in city fortunes, however, American cities
continue to be weak in important ways. Consider Detroit, which declared
the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history after a state receiver was
appointed to take over the city’s government. 3 Some Detroit residents
protested the suspension of elective municipal government, but for most
outsiders, neither the declaration of bankruptcy nor the appointment of a state
receiver garnered much attention or outrage.4 Questions about the efficacy
and justice of appointing unelected state officials to govern entire cities were
only raised after the crisis in Flint, another Michigan city with an appointed
state receiver.5 In Flint, public officials who had replaced the elected city
government failed to respond to complaints about the city’s water supply,
which was subsequently shown to be thoroughly contaminated. 6 The
failures of Flint’s water supply revealed both the entrenched inequities in
America’s basic infrastructure and the striking limits of the electoral,
economic, and political power of residents living in struggling
municipalities.7
This lack of local political power is not restricted to municipalities in
serious economic crisis. After Charlotte, North Carolina adopted a
transgender rights ordinance, the state legislature responded with sweeping
legislation aimed at limiting the authority of local governments to regulate
across a number of areas. 8 The North Carolina legislature objected to
2. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1117-22 (2007). See
also Scott L. Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government for Low-Wage
Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 189 (2009). Examples include: Newark, N.J., Envtl.
Just. & Cumulative Impact Ordinance (July 7, 2016); S.F., Cal., Admin. Code § 14.1(b)(6)
(2008) (San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance).
3. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into
Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-filesfor-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/JT83-7HAG].
4. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer is Named to Manage an Ailing Detroit,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/us/gov-rick-snyder-kevynorr-emergency-manager-detroit.html [https://perma.cc/58VA-VC6C].
5. Richard Schragger, Flint Wasn’t Allowed Democracy, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/a_big_reason_for_t
he_flint_water_crisis_no_democracy_there.html [https://perma.cc/GAM9-PPVV].
6. See Julie Bosman, Flint Water Crisis Inquiry Finds State Ignored Warning Signs,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/flint-water-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/TJP8-RWMH]. See also Schragger, supra note 5.
7. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1180-204 (2014); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical
Experimentation in States Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577
(2011).
8. See Dave Philipps, North Carolina Bans Local Anti-Discrimination Policies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-
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Charlotte’s law because it permitted transgender citizens to use bathrooms
that conformed to their gender identity, as opposed to their biological sex.
In a statute known popularly as HB2, the state not only overturned the
“bathroom” portion of the city’s ordinance but also declared that wage and
hours regulation, municipal contracting, employment discrimination, and
public accommodations laws are all “properly . . . issue[s] of general,
statewide concern, such that . . . [state statutes] supersede and preempt” any
contrary local policy.9 Many American cities have adopted local LGBT antidiscrimination ordinances, living wage laws, or other forms of social welfare
regulation.10 And many cities have seen state legislatures preempt those
ordinances, laws, and regulations.11
What is striking about city power is how constrained it actually is. In
1967, political scientist Robert Dahl observed that “[c]ity-building is one of
the most obvious incapacities of Americans.”12 Little has changed over the
last fifty years, as suburbanization, deindustrialization, and the shift of
policy-making authority from cities to states and states to the federal
government has continued apace. Despite the urban resurgence of the last
decades and the increased prominence of municipal lawmaking, the city’s
political economy remains the same. Cities in the U.S. federal system
continue to be limited in important ways. The city’s exercise of authority,
political influence, and economic power is incidental to, or parasitic on, the
exercise of power by the private sector or higher-level governments.
This Article describes the current political economy of city power and
efforts to reform and remake it. U.S. cities are resurging in many cases and
their economic power sometimes generates policymaking power. But the
two examples noted—state takeovers of distressed cities and state
preemption of municipal law—strikingly illustrate the significant distance
bathroom-use-by-birth-gender.html [https://perma.cc/69JW-DUKX]. See also Richard
Schragger, North Carolina’s “Bathroom Bill” and the Right to Local Self-Government,
BALKINIZATION BLOG (Mar. 25, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/03/north-carolinasbathroom-bill-and-right.html [https://perma.cc/YZT2-YA5U].
9. An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing
Facilities, N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2 (2016).
10. For a description of LBGT anti-discrimination ordinances see generally, Alan
Greenblatt, Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’ War on Cities, GOVERNING (Mar.
25, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-states-cities-preemption-laws.html
[https://perma.cc/5BHJ-JWC8]; Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances
that Include Gender Identity, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/citiesand-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender
[https://perma.cc/2KTL-FM8L]. For a description of living wage laws see Heidi Swarts &
Ion Bogdan Vasi, Which U.S. Cities Adopt Living Wage Ordinances? Predictors of Adoption
of a New Labor Tactic 1994–2006, 47 URB. AFF. REV. 743, 743–44 (2011).
11. Greenblatt, supra note 10.
12. Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 964
(1967).
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between municipal policy efforts and the city’s actual political and economic
clout. U.S. cities can do little without support from state authorities, which
often block them from adopting preferred local legislation, fail to come to
their aid when they are struggling, and take them over with relative impunity
when they fail.13
Part I describes two significant features of the U.S. political economy that
account for the city’s weakness in relation both to markets and the
centralizing state. The first is the practice of treating cities as competitors in
a global marketplace for capital and labor, which requires cities to “compete”
for investment. The second is the practice of state-based federalism, which
increases the number of political competitors who seek to influence or
control city policy-making.
Part II considers past efforts to address these weaknesses through three
institutional reforms: home rule, national urban policy, and regionalism.
Home rule efforts in the mid-to-late-nineteenth century sought to address the
attractiveness of cities to state legislators eager to exploit the political and
financial opportunities of the urban population boom. 14 Home rule gave
municipalities some modicum of self-government, but it did not aid those
cities that would experience industrial decline many decades later. In the
more recent past, national urban policy and regionalism have been offered
as strategies to buttress cities in decline and provide more financial support
for cities in the face of suburban growth.15 Those efforts have also been for
the most part ineffective in providing urban financial stability for a
significant number of municipalities.
Part III considers more ambitious (and to this point, mostly theoretical)
efforts to challenge the city’s basic lack of economic and political power. A
range of advocates and theorists have argued that city powerlessness is a
deep feature of the global market economy. Critical theorists argue that the
city’s lack of power is a core component of a particular kind of liberal
economic order—one that privileges rights of property over rights of selfgovernance—and that the answer to city weakness is to challenge that
prioritization.16
These disparate challenges to the liberal market order have failed to
coalesce and seem unlikely to do so anytime soon. Nevertheless, Part IV
See, e.g., Davey & Walsh supra note 3; Philipps supra note 8.
See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
See infra note 86. See generally infra Parts II.B and II.C.
See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS (Princeton Univ. Press, eds., 1999). See generally, CITIES FOR PEOPLE NOT
FOR PROFIT: CRITICAL URBAN THEORY AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY (Neil Brenner, et al. eds.,
2012); David Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy: A Critique, 38 J. URB. AFF. 79 (2015);
Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L. REV. 177
(2016).
13.
14.
15.
16.
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suggests how the recent urban resurgence offers an opportunity to open-up
some political and economic space for the exercise of city power, short of a
radical transformation of the existing economic order. What is necessary is
a political movement, not necessarily a political revolution.
This Article does not make a sustained argument on behalf of that
movement.17 Instead, it describes the reasons for the city’s economic and
political weakness and a set of institutional and academic responses to that
weakness. The reader does not need to agree that city power is ultimately
desirable.
That being said, this Article suggests here and in conclusion that city
power can serve as an antidote to a growing global democracy deficit.
Neither the nation-state nor the transnational corporation seem able to
address the political alienation and economic instability felt by many citizens
in the U.S. and elsewhere. This felt instability has given rise to both leftand right-wing populism, often tainted by xenophobia and nationalism.18 In
the United States, Donald Trump’s presidential victory is illustrative of the
latter. His rise to power is consistent with the British vote to exit the
European Union and the increasing success of reactionary parties on the
continent.19
There are many sources of citizen dissatisfaction with conventional
politics at the turn of the twenty-first century—immigration, terrorism,
outright racism, and economic stagnation all contribute. But surely another
factor is the failure of national elites and distant government bureaucracies
to provide effective responses to the economic and social dislocations caused
by the global market economy. For those who see the city as the best chance
for a robust local participatory politics, who celebrate the city as holding
out—in Dahl’s words—the “promise for the good life lived jointly with
fellow citizens,”20 challenging the basis of city weakness is a central task. If
it can be fostered and protected, city power is one possible answer to
increasingly potent economic and political estrangement.

17. For such an argument, see RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE
Univ. Press eds., 2016) (hereinafter CITY POWER).
18. See generally, Robert Kuttner, Sanders, Trump, and Economic Populism, AM.
PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/sanders-trump-and-economic-populism
[https://perma.cc/A8K3-9CGR]; Jeff Stein, Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Europe’s Far-Right
Stoke Fear in Brussels, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-brexiteurope-far-right-fear-brussels-527980 [https://perma.cc/Y9ZW-VLZD].
19. See generally, Steven Erlanger, Brexit Proved to be Sign of Things to Come in US,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/world/europe/for-usbrexit-was-a-sign-of-things-to-come.html [https://perma.cc/2PNT-SH4P].
20. Dahl, supra note 12, at 964.
IN A GLOBAL AGE (Oxford
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I. WEAK CITIES
Two features of the U.S. political economy define and limit city power.
The first is the ideology and practice of market primacy—the idea that most
goods and services should be produced through (free) markets and that state
power should generally be limited to preventing, or solving, market failures.
The second is state-based federalism, which interposes a regional tier of
government in the U.S. between the nation and its cities. Market primacy
shifts power toward the private sector, while state-based federalism drives
policymaking toward central governments.
A.

Market-Based Local Government

Two aspects of the ideology of market primacy influence city power.
First, the city is understood to be dependent on private investment for its
economic health and welfare. Second, the city is understood to be engaged
in a competition for private investment with other locations. Local officials,
citizens, and interest groups all believe and act on these understandings. The
municipal politics that results tends to be development-favoring. Local
politics and policy are generally premised on the view that the exercise of
city power is possible only to the extent that city officials can make alliances
with those private-side economic actors who exercise real power.21
Market-based local government is animated by a kernel of economic truth:
that labor and capital are generally mobile and cities and other local
governments are stuck in place. From this observation, urban scholars and
policymakers have generally embraced the idea—made famous by Paul
Peterson’s concept of “city limits”22—that the range of plausible city policies
are those that can be shown to enhance the community’s economic
prosperity. Prosperity depends on private sector success. City policies are
thus limited to those that attract and retain capital and labor in a competitive
inter-jurisdictional environment. Pursuant to this view, what ultimately
governs the city are the financial, labor, and land markets, which place
stringent limits on the city’s ability to act autonomously. Market-based local
government drives policymaking toward accommodating the private sector,
namely capital and labor, which cities must attract and retain to remain
economically vibrant.
The theoretical and policy program that follows from this view of city
competition has three salient features. First, the competitive paradigm
strongly suggests that social welfare redistribution or regulation is not an

21. See CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-1988, 233
(Univ. Press of Kan. eds., 1989) (noting that the “elite controls resources of the kind and in
the amount able to enhance the regime’s capacity to govern”).
22. See generally, PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (Univ. of Chi. Press eds., 1981).
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appropriate task for sub-federal governments and certainly not appropriate
for cities.23 The city cannot risk capital flight by taxing it. If firms and
residents are overtaxed they will flee. More importantly, if the city engages
in redistributions that do not directly contribute to economic growth, the city
will attract more needy poor people than it can support, further increasing
the costs to the city and exacerbating capital flight. 24 On this theory,
metropolitan-area tax-base competition means that cities can only
realistically undertake developmental spending.25
Second, the competitive paradigm predicts that cities will invariably
converge on similar development and business-friendly policies.26 Any city
that resists will be abandoned by core industries, small businesses, and
talented labor pools. “Business-friendly” policies might include subsidizing
in-locality businesses, providing tax incentives for development, reducing
regulation to a minimum, and generally keeping taxes low.27 They could
also mean providing amenities that are desired by higher-income residents
and educated or talented workers in particular industries. In other words,
cities have no choice but to adopt an attraction and retention strategy aimed
at the most mobile taxpayers. And though cities can adopt slightly different
strategies, in the end they will be mostly doing the same things. On this
view, political ideology therefore plays a relatively small role in the running
of cities.28
23. See id.
24. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, 131–40 (Edward Elgar Pub. eds., 1972);
PETERSON, supra note 22, at 182–83; PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 27–28
(The Twentieth Century Fund 1995); Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Federalism, in JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO
CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE, 160–61 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. eds., 2000). But see
Timothy J. Goodspeed, A Re-Examination of the Use of Ability to Pay Taxes by Local
Governments, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 319, 320 (1989).
25. See PETERSON, supra note 22.
26. See id.
27. Cities should “avoid redistributive policies that target the rich and drive them away.”
Edward L. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities, in MAKING CITIES WORK: PROSPECTS AND
POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 22, 59 (Robert P. Inman ed., 2009). Similarly, cities should
avoid overregulating business and should “be responsive to the needs of developers and
entrepreneurs.” Robert P. Inman, City Prospects, City Policies, in MAKING CITIES WORK:
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 1, 17. City mayors should “fashion a progrowth coalition.” Id. at 18. One way to do this is to “provide the amenities that will attract
smart people and then get out of their way.” Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities, in MAKING
CITIES WORK: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA, at 59. Finally, declining cities
are disposable assets, so “[i]n many cases, people are best served by leaving areas that have
passed their period of economic prominence.” Id. at 61.
28. PETERSON, supra note 22, at 115 (claiming that the issues faced by local governments
are by their nature non-ideological and hence do not give rise to party politics); Elisabeth R.
Gerber & Daniel J. Hopkins, When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral
Partisanship on City Policy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 326 (2011) (finding that spending areas and
city revenue streams, over which cities have only limited discretion, show no strong partisan
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Third, market-based local government celebrates the theoretical benefits
that will result from inter-city competition. Poorly run cities will pay for
their misdeeds by capital and labor flight, and well run cities will gain, as
migrants flock there. According to proponents of the market-based view,
government will be made better by the discipline imposed by the threat of
capital flight and by cities’ attentiveness to voter preferences.29
Moreover, this attention will bring economic growth.30 Implicit in the
market-based account is the notion that as long as cities adopt the right
policies, they will increase their market share. If they adopt the wrong
policies, they will reduce it. Cities are thus at fault when they decline and
can be credited with good decisions when they boom. Growth is highly
susceptible to local policy choices. But those choices have to be marketfriendly and are dictated by the vicissitudes of mobile labor and capital.
The ideology and practice of market-based local government thus
parallels the ideology and practice of market primacy generally. The claim
is that one can enhance social welfare by structuring government on the
model of a competitive marketplace.31 In the theoretical local-government
market, capital calls the tune and cities sing it. The belief that cities are
limited in their policy choices because real power resides in labor and capital
markets is almost canonical.
B.

State-Based Federalism

Market primacy is reinforced by the form that federalism takes in the
United States. U.S. state-based federalism privileges states over other forms
of sub-national government as a constitutional matter.
Yet local
governments are charged with significant responsibilities, even as they often
lack the resources to meet them. States exercise significant power over their
political subdivisions, but state officials need not take responsibility for local
economic conditions. From the perspective of the city, this is the worst
influence). But see Michael Craw, Overcoming City Limits, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 361 (2006)
(describing and contesting this view). See also Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw,
Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605 (2014).
29. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 58
(2001); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418–
23 (1956). See also Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: MarketPreserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 1, 5 (1995)
(noting that the mobility of capital gives rise to a diverse array of public goods packages);
OATES, supra note 24, at 49–50.
30. See Weingast, supra note 29. The “growth machine” describes the political sociology
of a development-centered urban politics. Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine:
Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976). See generally JOHN R.
LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE
(1987).
31. See Weingast, supra note 29.
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possible state of affairs. State-based federalism multiplies city officials’
political competitors while the formal distinction between federal, state, and
local authority allows those competitors to pick and choose when to
intervene.
This state of affairs is a function of the mixed status of local governments
in the United States. Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, states exercise
plenary power over their local government jurisdictions. For purposes of
federal constitutional law, cities are generally treated as convenient agencies
of their states.32 A city cannot assert a constitutional claim to exercise any
particular powers, to adopt its own form of government, or to exist at all.33
Nevertheless, under state constitutions, cities often enjoy a fairly high degree
of formal autonomy, and as a matter of practice, cities exercise a fair amount
of independent authority over their local economies and taxing and spending
decisions.34 In comparison to other constitutional systems, the American
federal system is decentralized as a formal matter.35
Three features of that system contribute to city weakness. The first is a
mismatch between regulatory demands and regulatory scale. Cities are
charged with fostering a positive local economic climate, promoting
employment, and providing for the health and welfare of local citizens. But
cities are not remotely autonomous. A city’s fiscal status and economic
health are deeply affected by global financial, labor, and goods markets.
State and national tax, redistribution, immigration, land use, labor, and
industrial policies all impact cities significantly. Yet because the provision
of basic municipal services is understood to be a local responsibility, the
variations in that provision normally do not concern the state.
Second, the formal separation of powers permits state officials to pick and
choose when to intervene in local affairs without ever taking direct
responsibility for local conditions. States are quick to override local
decisions with which they disagree but slow to take on responsibility for
providing basic municipal goods. 36 Cities thus may have significant

32. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
33. See id. at 179.
34. See generally COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNANCE: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (Bas
Denters & Lawrence E. Rose eds., 2005) (comparing local autonomy across countries).
35. See id.
36. This result is a predictable outcome of a three-tiered federal system dominated by
regional governments. Though some commentators have suggested that state-based
federalism enhances city power, see Roderick M. Hills Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism?
The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J. L. & POL. 187, 215 (2005), the opposite appears
to be true. As Frank Cross has argued, formally federal states may be more centralized than
formally unitary ones. See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(2002). This is particularly due to the fact that larger organizations are more likely to be
decentralized than smaller ones. We might expect a large, unitary state to devolve significant
decision-making powers to smaller-scaled entities, many of them smaller than American
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responsibilities but insufficient resources to meet them. At the same time,
cities exercise little influence over state and national demands. Because of
the existence of three formally separate bureaucracies, state and federal
authorities rarely need the direct cooperation or assistance of local officials
to achieve state or national aims. This formal independence reduces the
city’s capacity to influence policies coming from the center.37
Finally, third, the existence of a regional tier of government—the states—
exacerbates the vertical competition between elected officials.38 City leaders
do not enjoy a monopoly on local representation. Aside from other city
officials, elected state and federal officeholders also represent local
constituents. The political competition that results involves taking credit for
popular policies and avoiding blame for unpopular ones. State-level “taxrelief” and other types of unfunded mandates are an example.
The gap between state-wide preferences and local ones can be large. In
North Carolina, for example, the “bathroom bill” pitted a politically
conservative legislature representing exurban and rural interests against
politically progressive mayors representing more liberal urbanites. 39
Consider also New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s policy disputes with
the governor of New York State, Andrew Cuomo. Despite their shared
party-affiliation (both are Democrats), Cuomo opposed de Blasio’s plan to
tax high-income earners in the city to fund universal, city-wide pre-K
programs.40 Cuomo also initially objected to a city-wide minimum wage
increase and to de Blasio’s efforts to limit the expansion of charter schools.41
Eventually, Cuomo agreed to fund a pre-K program, but rejected de Blasio’s
proposed tax. Cuomo also adopted his own minimum wage proposal (which

states. Moreover, a middle, regional tier of government is likely to take up the policy and
fiscal space that would otherwise be occupied by local governments in a unitary system. A
middle tier of government will reduce the political power of more local officials. See id.
37. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that in European federations, the assignment of centrally mandated duties to local
governments enhances local power). In Printz, the Supreme Court endorsed an anticommandeering principle, under which localities cannot be forced to pursue federal aims.
Under this approach, decentralized government is best served by defining an exclusive area
of local control and protecting it against encroachment. See id. at 900.
38. See generally Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On
the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542 (2006) (hereinafter
Can Strong Mayors?).
39. See Philipps, supra note 8.
40. The Editorial Board, Political Rumble Over Universal Pre-K, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2014, at A26.
41. Michael Powell, Cat in Albany is Outfoxing New York City’s Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2014, at A22.
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the state legislature eventually adopted) and rejected de Blasio’s charter
school reforms.42
For city leaders, the gap between formal authority and political influence
is where much relevant policy is made.43 Very few of de Blasio’s significant
plans could be achieved without the governor’s (and ultimately the state
legislature’s) support.44
For cities in fiscal crisis, that support has not recently been forthcoming.
Detroit, Flint, and other rustbelt cities have been declining for at least fifty
years.45 But their inability to garner sufficient state and national aid reflects
an underlying reality: cities qua cities in the U.S. have few political allies
and exercise limited political influence, either in statehouses or in
Congress.46
That was not always the case. The New Deal coalition relied on urban
ethnics and African Americans, which made city mayors powerful political
brokers.47 Even as the city declined, New Haven’s mayor Richard Lee was
able to garner significant federal funds in the 1950s and 60s era of urban
redevelopment.48 As suburbanization took hold in the second half of the
twentieth century, however, power shifted out of cities and continues to do
so.49 White flight resulted in majority-black cities with metropolitan areas
becoming more economically and ideological segmented. 50 The gulf

42. Jesse McKinley & Vivian Yee, New York Budget Deal With Higher Minimum Wage
Is Reached, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/nyregion/
new-york-budget-deal-with-higher-minimum-wage-is-reached.html [https://perma.cc/Z4JPQXBC].
43. See Schragger, Can Strong Mayors?, supra note 38.
44. Alexander Burns, For Cuomo and de Blasio, the Tension Comes Easily, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/nyregion/for-cuomo-and-de-blasiothe-tension-comes-easily.html [https://perma.cc/ZZH7-3ZWL].
45. Daniel Hartley, Urban Decline in Rust-Belt Cities, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND,
(May 20, 2013), https://clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economiccommentary/2013-economic-commentaries/ec-201306-urban-decline-in-rust-belt-cities.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G7W6-C36A].
46. See Schragger, supra note 38. See generally ROGER BILES, THE FATE OF CITIES:
URBAN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1945-2000 (2011).
47. See Forty Years of Urban Economic Development: A Retrospective, INT’L ECON. DEV.
COUNCIL, 12 (2008), http://www.iedconline.org/clientuploads/Downloads/history/Forty_
Years_Urban_Economic_Development.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKT6-24CF].
48. See DONALD H. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS,
MAYORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING 4–5, 35–38, 48–75 (1974).
49. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF POSTURBAN AMERICA (Colum. U. Press 2006).
50. See Alana Semuels, White Flight Never Ended, THE ATLANTIC (July 30, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/399980/
[https://perma.cc/Y6CS-RBHD]. See generally KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (Princeton U. Press ed., 2005); THOMAS
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between Democratic cities and Republican exurbs continues to widen, aided
by highly sophisticated political gerrymandering.51 This political landscape
makes state legislatures even less likely to be responsive to urban
constituencies.
II. EFFORTS TO ENHANCE CITY POWER
The two sources of city weakness—market-based local government and
the structure of U.S. state-based federalism—reinforce each other. Marketbased theories of local government insist that cities cannot and should not
adopt certain policies—like social welfare redistribution—without harming
their economies. At the same time, cities are encouraged to engage in intermunicipal competition for capital on the theory that competition will both
discipline cities to provide efficient services and encourage overall economic
growth.
Meanwhile, state-based federalism creates the political conditions under
which state officials are likely to engage in selective localism: picking and
choosing what local policies to override, while avoiding responsibility for
underlying economic conditions. Market-based local government informs
decisions made through selective localism. If private sector economic
growth is or should be the city’s chief goal, then state intervention should be
geared toward enhancing city competitiveness, not improving citizen wellbeing through other means.
State resistance to lending economic aid to struggling cities is an example.
States have been loath to bail-out their declining cities on the theory that
doing so will merely encourage the inefficiencies that led to failure in the
first place. 52 Opponents of bailouts argue that back-stopping local
economies will short-circuit the beneficial inter-municipal competition that
generates efficient local government.53 States seem willing to intervene to
assist struggling cities only when the state’s credit rating appears to be at
risk, and then mostly in order to get the city back in the business of promoting

SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POST-WAR DETROIT
(Princeton U. Press 1st ed. 1996).
51. Jenny Jarvie, The South’s New Divide: Blue Cities and Red States, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
20, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-south-culture-wars-20160420-story.html
[https://perma.cc/FC7W-C9KQ].
52. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (2012). For contrary views, see Kevin A. Kordana,
Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1068-69 (1997); Richard
Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860 (2012).
53. See Gillette, supra note 52, at 310. But see Richard Schragger, Citizens Versus
Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 796-803 (2012) (hereinafter Citizens).
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business.54 The end result is that cities do not receive help when they are
failing, but invite interference when they are succeeding.
The history of local government law in the U.S. illustrates both the
dominance of the market as an organizing principle and the opportunism of
selective localism.
A long-running trope of American municipal
government is that city power is consistently vulnerable to manipulation by
both private sector actors and state and national officials. 55 Institutional
reformers and urban policymakers have sought to address this problem—to
create strategies that limit the political pathologies of inter-governmental
relations while giving cities the capacity to pursue the material well-being of
their citizens. This Part describes three such approaches: home rule, national
urban policy, and regional government. All three reforms have sought to
address the city’s economic and political dependence. All have had little
success.
A.

Home Rule

Home rule has generally been the formal solution to the problem of the
city’s lack of legislative autonomy. Home rule grants in state constitutions
or in state statutes are written to permit cities to adopt legislation in the
absence of specific state authorization.56 Home rule grants can also provide
a defense against preemptive state statutes, though these grants of home rule
“immunity” are less common.57 The promise of home rule is that it will free
cities from state constraints and state officials’ intermeddling. The history
of home rule, however, complicates this picture. Home rule reformers were
historically ambivalent about city power—as David Barron has shown58—
and home rule grants have often reinforced city limits instead of overcoming
them.
The history is important, for it shows that home rule was part of a package
of Progressive Era state constitutional innovations meant to clean up state

54. See Frank Shafroth, The Risks States Take for Their Distressed Cities, VOICES OF THE
GOVERNING (June 30, 2014), http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-states-wallstreet-credit-risk-distressed-localities-municipal-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/8YPGR7GC] (discussing state reaction to municipal bankruptcies or near-bankruptcies in Alabama,
California, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island); THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE
STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS, 12 (July 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/04/pew_state_role_in_local_government_fin
ancial_distress.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6L4-WT4G]. But see Schragger, Citizens, supra note
53, at 799-00 (contesting the contagion literature).
55. See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local
Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83 (1986).
56. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263 (2003).
57. Id. at 2290.
58. See generally id.
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politics.59 In an era of tremendous urban growth, massive wealth was being
generated in the cities, and “the large rewards which lay in cities’ offices,
their contracts, and the franchises in their streets became the mark of the
political spoilsman in the state legislature.”60 In part, home rule grants were
intended to prevent the exploitation of the city by state officials and the
special interests that sought to take advantage of an expanding urban
populace. Inter-municipal competition to build infrastructure in the
nineteenth century led to dubious giveaways to vested interests and
contributed to state and local bond defaults during economic downturns.
Reformers believed that keeping state government out of the affairs of
municipal government would stem state-wide corruption.61
The institutional solution to this grasping of city-generated wealth was
multi-pronged, and only partially aimed to protect city decision-making.
Indeed, reformers targeted avaricious legislators whether they were in
statehouses or on city councils. 62 State constitutional reform involved
restricting state legislative interference in municipal affairs, but it also
involved restricting the ability for cities to favor private economic interests
in other ways. 63 Public purpose requirements were added to state
constitutions and were meant to limit the state and municipal governments’
authority to use public monies for private projects.64 State constitutional
debt limitations prevented state and municipal governments from taking on
debt.65
The turn of the century also witnessed the rise of state boards of health,
water, sewage, and schools—the beginnings of state administrative law.66
State utility commissions were adopted in response to the corrupt awarding
of municipal contracts for gas, electric, streetcar, and telephone services.67
Meanwhile, city charter reforms transferred important local government
functions to nonpolitical professional city managers.68 These reforms were
of a piece with the Progressive Era emphasis on technical and expert
59. Id.
60. See id. at 2286 (quoting HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 6 (1916)).
61. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA,
1870-1900 (1984).
62. See id.
63. See id. See generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, 639-48 (7th ed. 2009).
64. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 63, at 816-19.
65. See id. See generally GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW
STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008).
66. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION IN AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT (2002).
67. See generally Barron, supra note 56.
68. See Schragger, Can Strong Mayors?, supra note 38.
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administration. 69 Home rule was not in the main a “local autonomy”
strategy, but a “good government” strategy. State constitutional reforms
often limited cities as much as they empowered them.
Importantly, that is how home rule continues to function, in three ways.
First, home rule grants rarely include immunity from state preemptive
legislation. In most cases, states are free to override local ordinances unless
those ordinances have a very limited reach, such as those relating to the
internal organization of municipal government.70
Second, and similarly, home rule grants of initiative have generally been
interpreted by state courts to apply only to those matters that are deemed to
be “local” in nature. Issues that have effects outside the city’s borders or
impede uniformity throughout the state are considered to be matters of
statewide concern, both ineligible for local regulation and subject to state
override.71 State courts have generally erred on the side of state power—
understandably so, as most local regulations have some spillover effects.
The local regulation of particular industries, employment relationships, or
wage and hours laws are especially prone to be rejected as they are easily
characterized as having detrimental effects on the statewide business climate
or the statewide interest in reducing compliance costs.72 As is the case with
any judicial effort to distinguish the local from the national, what is a matter
of local or statewide concern seems often to be a function of the substantive
policy preferences of the judge hearing the case.
Third, home rule grants do not address the imbalance of power between
cities and the market. Home rule addresses the city-state relationship, but
not the city-capital relationship. Shifting the locus of authority from the state
legislature to the city council does not change the fact that private economic
interests still exercise outsized power in municipal politics.
In other words, home rule grants do not free cities from the demand that
they act as competitors in a global market for mobile capital.73 While local
autonomy can prevent the worst excesses of state interference, it does not
ultimately challenge the municipal politics of economic growth, with its
emphasis on the governmental promotion of, participation in, and
subsidization of private commercial enterprise. Indeed, home rule reinforces

69. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17, at 64.
70. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1127-33.
71. See id. at 1127.
72. See Stahl, supra note 16, at 177 (“Under the doctrine of home rule, local governments
can often only act in matters deemed ‘local’ in nature and cannot regulate ‘statewide’ issues
that may have impacts beyond local borders.”).
73. See Stahl, supra note 16, at 177. See also SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17.
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that politics, for it is generally interpreted—as already noted—not to apply
to local commercial and financial regulations.74
Thus, for cities that are prospering, home rule protects initiatives that
serve the state’s interests—mostly those policies that are propertyprotecting. The New York State legislature’s resistance to New York City’s
effort to impose a local millionaire tax is an example.75
In contrast, for cities in economic decline, home rule provides a figment
of legal autonomy without practical capacity. The declining city in the local
government market can do little with its legal autonomy except align with
private-side business interests in an often vain attempt to generate economic
development and stem the exodus of its tax base.76 Detroit exercised its
power of eminent domain to entice General Motors to build an automobile
plant in the city. 77 New London, Connecticut, similarly exercised its
eminent domain power in an effort to encourage Pfizer to relocate there.78
In both cases, the cities did not act out of economic strength, but rather out
of economic weakness.79 And in both cases, after opening businesses there,
the private corporate beneficiaries of the cities’ largesse ultimately relocated,
abandoning each city when economic conditions did not improve. Home
rule does not equal city power. Many times, what declining cities need is
more state intervention to mute the inter-city competition for tax base, not
less.
As many observers have pointed out, local governments are generally
permitted to adopt policies intended to attract and retain economic resources
and prevent their redistribution. 80 Home rule as exercised by suburban
municipalities makes it very difficult for states to impose inter-local revenuesharing, to override exclusionary land-use policies, or to promote state-wide
fair housing.81 Suburbs use land use laws to limit low-income housing and
preserve the local tax base.82 Suburban home rule limits cities’ capacity to

74. See Stahl, supra note 16, at 188-94.
75. Jesse McKinley, New York Budget Hinges on Contentious Tax on the Rich, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/nyregion/new-york-budgetmillionaire-tax.html [https://perma.cc/8Q3D-AY27].
76. See generally STONE, supra note 21.
77. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 (1981), overruled
by Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445 (2004).
78. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
79. See id. See also Poletown, 410 Mich., at 630.
80. See Stahl, supra note 16, at 205-20; Diller, supra note 2, at 1132-33.
81. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990).
82. See id. See also Richard C. Schragger, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the Geography
of School Finance Reform, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 1, 4 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L.
Goluboff eds., 2008); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371,
437 (2001).
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prevent flight as it preserves the suburbs’ capacity to avoid responsibility for
the regional poor.
In sum, as Kenneth Stahl has argued, “home-rule doctrine . . . suits the
agenda of both the state and capital.”83 Home rule does not protect the city
when it seeks to adopt legislation that contradicts the state’s basic
commitments, especially the commitment to economic development. For
cities in economic decline, home rule provides no real answer to the forces
of global disinvestment. For prosperous cities and suburbs, home rule allows
for business-friendly or property-protecting local policies but is often
interpreted to reject local redistributive regulations. Home rule tends to
empower those jurisdictions in the metropolitan region that already enjoy
economic and political power. And it does nothing to reduce the city’s
dependence on private economic investment or mute the competitive
scramble for economic resources.
B.

National Urban Policy

Home rule was a Progressive Era response to the problems of state and
local inter-governmental relations. In the mid-twentieth century, national
urban policy became the focus for city planners, anti-poverty advocates,
mayors, and urban developers concerned about the decline of cities.
National efforts to grapple with ethnic white and black ghettos began with
the New Deal, and continued through the War on Poverty and into the
remainder of the twentieth century.84 The federal government subsidized
housing, transportation, schools, and other municipal infrastructure. 85
Federal urban policy has been much less ambitious since the Reagan
administration and the reduction in federal funds in the 1980s. 86
Nevertheless, federal monies (or the lack thereof) are influential in shaping
affordable housing, transportation, and education policy in U.S. metropolitan
areas.87
Federal aid to cities can be understood as a way to liberate them from both
their market-based resource constraints and from interference by state
officials. Unfortunately, federal support for the rebuilding of cities,
especially in the urban renewal period, exacerbated existing local market
forces instead of challenging them.88 And while federal programs do have

83. Stahl, supra note 16, at 186.
84. See generally MITCHELL DUNEIER, GHETTO: THE INVENTION OF A PLACE, THE HISTORY
OF AN IDEA (2016).
85. See generally BILES, supra note 46.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Jane Jacobs famously argued against urban renewal and federal highway building in
her THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). On urban renewal generally,

108

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

the potential to free cities from state dependence, often these programs—for
all their good intentions—reinforce the same metropolitan-area political
dynamics that they were intended to avoid.
Indeed, it is well-documented that federal housing, urban renewal, and
transportation policies reinforced racial residential patterns, encouraged the
flight from cities, and failed to stop urban decline. Housing financing in the
mid-twentieth century occurred along racial lines, deepening divisions in
metropolitan areas instead of overcoming them. African American
neighborhoods were starved of financing, while white neighborhoods—
especially those outside the city—received significant government support.89
The federal government dictated lending standards for federally-backed
home loans, which favored new construction over renovation, single-family
instead of multi-family home construction, and homogeneously white
instead of mixed or African American neighborhoods. 90 Redlining—
denying loans in African American neighborhoods—was an explicit federal
policy.91
Public housing also reinforced existing housing patterns. Federallyfunded public housing was purposely segregated, as federal officials bowed
to local pressure to avoid mixing “inharmonious social groups.”92 In many
cases, local opposition derailed public housing altogether. The influx of
federal highway funds, combined with federal financing of new homes,
accelerated white flight to the suburbs.93 The lack of quality housing in the
cities fostered even more flight.94
Federal urban renewal funds sought to stem this flight. But urban renewal
efforts were also infected by racism and mostly resulted in disinvestment
from poor neighborhoods. Downtown redevelopment schemes used slum
clearance and blight removal to replace poor minority residents and the

see Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 31-35, 47 (2003).
89. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 203-09, 213-18 (1985)； DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING
AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 1–8, 16 (1995) (noting that in the suburban-shaping years
between 1930 and 1960, less than one percent of all mortgages in the nation were issued to
African Americans.).
90. See JACKSON, supra note 89.
91. Id.; Fed. Hous. Admin., Underwriting Manual: Underwriting and Valuation
Procedure Under Title II of the National Housing Act Part I, P 323(3) (1936) (“The infiltration
of inharmonious racial groups will produce the same effects as those which follow the
introduction of nonconforming land uses which tend to lower the levels of land values and to
lessen the desirability of residential areas.”).
92. Fed. Hous. Admin., Underwriting Manual: Underwriting and Valuation Procedure
Under Title II of the National Housing Act Part I, P 323(3) (1936).
93. PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW, 291-94 (1988).
94. See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 138-53.
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businesses that sustained them with higher-income residents and amenities
intended to appeal to wealthy suburbanites.95 Alternatively, federal funds
were used to build highways through existing low-income neighborhoods,
often destroying them in the process.96
More generally, cities systematically redirected capital away from poor
neighborhoods to downtown business districts, where it was used to prop up
ailing commercial rents or remove unwelcome populations.97 Most of these
efforts were unsuccessful in stemming urban flight. Nevertheless,
neighborhoods on the periphery and minority city residents suffered
mightily. In the African American community, redevelopment was known
derisively as “negro-removal.”98
To be sure, federal money in itself is not bad and has the potential to
restore economic stability. In the 1930s, only the national government had
the resources and wherewithal to bring the country out of the Great
Depression. Federal monies were used during the New Deal period to build
housing, schools, parks, hospitals and other infrastructure that helped the
urban working class move into the middle class. The problem was and has
been that national programs do not generally avoid capture by those interests
that already exercise power in metropolitan regions: suburbanites and
downtown business interests. Even now, after the heyday of urban renewal,
city rejuvenation efforts paid for with federal monies often disenfranchise
and uproot the urban poor, while shifting monies to corporate interests.99
Moreover, federal policy cannot easily undo the city/suburb divide, which
has been entrenched through constitutional law. In Milliken v. Bradley,
decided in 1974, the Court held that school desegregation remedies had to
stop at the city line.100 This decision ushered in an era of increasing school
segregation in northern cities.101 With the Supreme Court’s blessing, whites
simply had to cross into a neighboring jurisdiction to avoid court-ordered
desegregation remedies. Other Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s limited
plaintiffs’ ability to bring fair housing challenges when suburban
municipalities sought to derail lower or middle income housing
developments.102

95. See Pritchett, supra note 88, at 6.
96. For an example, see ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER 850-78 (1974).
97. See Pritchett, supra note 88, at 47.
98. Id.
99. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 (1981).
100. 418 U.S. 717, 719-20 (1974).
101. Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 UCLA L. REV.
364, 452 (2015).
102. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Metropolitan Hous. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977); City

110

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

Present day federal housing policies have also had deleterious effects on
cities. The U.S. has pursued an aggressive homeownership policy since the
New Deal, providing subsidies for homeownership through the federal
mortgage-interest tax deduction and by financing home mortgages through
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The emphasis on homeownership has not
been accompanied by adequate oversight of lenders, however. During the
lead up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis that precipitated the 2008
Recession, predatory lenders engaged in “reverse redlining,” targeting
vulnerable (and usually African American) consumers for high-interest
loans.103 The influx of credit was soon followed by an outflow of equity, as
large numbers of lower-income buyers lost their homes when the housing
bubble burst.104 Notably, a number of cities attempted to regulate lending
standards in the lead-up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis, but state courts
invalidated municipal predatory lending laws as inappropriate exercises of
local power.105 Many cities are still trying to recover from the avalanche of
foreclosures that followed the 2008 crash.106
A national urban policy could support and strengthen declining urban
neighborhoods and return power to cities. Some of the policies adopted in
the 1960s pointed in that direction, authorizing neighborhood groups to
determine where federal monies would be spent.107 Today, however, federal
aid to cities is limited. Federal funds for public housing have almost
completely dried-up.108 Federal transportation dollars are scarce and mostly
seem to subsidize highway construction. 109 Federal education funds
available through No Child Left Behind are paired with punitive policies that

of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 676-78 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 138-40 (1971). See also
Construction Indus. Construction Ind. Ass’n, Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897, 904 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting challenge to local growth-control ordinances based on a
right to travel).
103. See Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer
Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J. L. & POL’Y 121, 126-27 (2009); Robert G. Schwemm &
Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act,
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 392 (2010). See also Michael Powell, Bank Accused of
Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/Y35E-VMJC].
104. See Fisher, supra note 103, at 127.
105. For a discussion, see Stahl, supra note 16, at 188-92.
106. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262 (2015), cert. granted
sub nom Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 136 S. Ct. 2544 (2016).
107. See BILES, supra note 46.
108. Id.
109. See id.
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result in the closing of “failing” urban schools and the shifting of monies to
corporate-run, charter schools.110
The national government has the resources to invest in American cities.
It did so in the New Deal and thereafter, sometimes to good effect. But
federal urban policy has generally been unreliable, vulnerable to national
political trends, and directed towards clearance and removal instead of
rebuilding in place. Federal intervention has not enhanced city power.
Indeed, federal policies have in many cases hurt the cities that they were
intended to help.
C.

Regionalism

A third oft-proposed solution to the resource-constrained city is
regionalism. Proponents of regional government urge consolidation of city
and suburban governments as a way to mute inter-local tax base competition.
The regionalist starts with the correct observation that the city/suburb divide
is a deep cause of metropolitan-area inequality.111 The fiscal need to provide
good services at a low tax price means that every jurisdiction competes to
attract regionally desirable residents and businesses while repelling those
that are undesirable. Cities have traditionally been at a disadvantage in this
competition, as they have more difficulty controlling the socio-economic
characteristics of their residents.
The regional solution involves extending the boundaries of the city
outward, so that it captures the tax base generated by suburban growth. As
David Rusk has repeatedly pointed out, “elastic cities”—those that can
expand their boundaries by annexing neighboring land—do better on
measures of inequality than do inelastic cities.112 If the tax base is moving
outside of city lines, then moving those lines makes a great deal of sense. A
metro government can redistribute from rich to poor areas within the
jurisdiction, capturing taxes from neighborhoods that would otherwise be
outside of the city’s taxing reach. A regional government gives the city
access to resources that it would not otherwise have.
Current-day metropolitanism emphasizes another component of
regionalism: the economic benefits of regional cooperation. Advocates
argue that metropolitan areas are unified labor and consumer markets and
that the lines between metro-area jurisdictions are wholly artificial.113 They
110. See generally James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004).
111. See generally REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM (Bruce Katz ed., Brookings Institution
Press 2000).
112. DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN
AMERICA 10-11 (1999).
113. See Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63, 105-06 (2013).
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further argue that the economic health of suburbs is higher in regions with
healthier cities, that residents and businesses choose among metropolitan
areas when deciding where to locate, and that cooperating municipalities can
better provide the kinds of regional amenities that residents and businesses
seek.114
The old regionalism and the new metropolitanism sound perfectly
sensible. But there are two significant drawbacks. The first is that
suburbanites do not seem convinced. American localism is deeply
entrenched and the idea of regional government has never been popular.
Metro government is a rare beast—found only in a handful of places. 115
Creating a regional tier of government requires the cooperation of the state
legislature and state legislators are unlikely to push for a policy that reduces
the power of suburban jurisdictions and seemingly increases the power of
metros. State legislatures instead tend to be responsive to their suburban
constituencies and are loath to create large-scale regional entities that can
compete with them for political power.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that cities would welcome consolidation
with inner-ring suburbs. Suburban resource needs have increased over the
last few decades, as suburban poverty has increased.116 Cities may not find
it to their advantage to be aligned with declining, fiscally-strapped suburban
municipalities.
The second drawback is that there is no reason to believe that regionalism
will result in significant shifts of political or economic resources to urban
areas. In assessing Louisville’s experiment with regional government, for
example, Hank Savitch and Ronald Vogel concluded that “city-county
114. See id. See also BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN
REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE
ECONOMY (2013).
115. Pat Hardy, The Consolidation of City and County Governments: A Look at the History
and Outcome-Based Research of These Efforts, MUN. TECH. ADVISORY SERV. (2012),
http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/Knowledgebase.nsf/0/F0DA25B83B3AE2EA85257A9F006
860E5/$FILE/consolidation%20research%20and%20history%20paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PC8C-TBCP]. See also MYRON LEVINE, URBAN POLITICS: CITIES AND
SUBURBS IN A GLOBAL AGE 250 (9th ed. 2015); Kathryn Murphy, Reshaping County
Government: A Look at City-County Consolidation, NAT’L ASSOC. OF COUNTIES (2012),
http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Reshaping%20County%20Government%
20A%20Look%20at%20City-County%20Consolidation.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECK8-7ZDA]
(noting that there have been only forty-one successful city county consolidations since 1805);
John Stuart Hall, Who Will Govern American Metropolitan Regions, and How, in CITIES AND
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63-65 (Donald Phares ed., 2015) (“A handful of other metropolitan
areas of the United States have adopted compromises in which limited regional functions of
government are provided by a metropolitan-wide government while many more localized
functions remain the purview of existing cities, towns, and counties. The best examples of
this approach are Miami, Portland, and Minneapolis-St. Paul.”).
116. See ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN POVERTY IN
AMERICA (2013).
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consolidation has enhanced the ability of affluent suburbanites while
reducing the political influence of blue-collar, inner-city residents,
particularly African American residents.” 117 They further concluded that
city-county consolidation is likely to result in a “more internally cohesive
[corporate] regime, coupled to weakened city neighborhoods that are less
able to influence the development agenda” and “more rather than less urban
sprawl.”118
It is highly plausible that a newly combined county-city government
would be dominated by suburban rather than urban interests. Regionalists
focus on the resources that will become available to the city once it
consolidates with the county. But political power tends to follow economic
power and there is no reason to believe that county residents will readily give
up their economic power. 119 Savitch and Vogel noted that after the
Louisville consolidation, it became more expensive to mount a mayoral
campaign for the combined city-county region and that business and
suburban interests dominated the local political process.120
Regionalism is a mobility strategy. The regionalist accepts the basic
premise of market-based government: that cities are unable to generate
economic growth without attracting and retaining mobile factors. As
Douglas Rae has argued, “Those of us who want better life chances for low
earning households in major cities, should set out to increase inequality by
attracting and keeping high earners, now greatly underrepresented in central
city populations.”121 The capture and tax agenda argues either for providing
amenities to the rich to encourage them to relocate, or for enlarging the city’s
boundaries—which serves the same purpose. Another element of the capture
and tax agenda is to disperse existing poor urban populations more evenly
throughout the region. Dispersal can take a number of forms: moving poor
people into mixed income housing in the suburbs, limiting the building of
low and moderate income housing in the urban core, or mandating that all
municipalities take their “fair share” of the regional poor.122
These policies seek to alter the demographics of city and suburb—a form
of residential engineering that often faces resistance from both white
suburbanites and minority urbanites. Attracting the rich requires cities to

117. DAVID IMBROSCIO, URBAN AMERICA RECONSIDERED: ALTERNATIVES FOR
GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 65 (2010) (quoting Savitch & Vogel).
118. See id. (quoting Savitch & Vogel).
119. See Sheryll Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000).
120. See IMBROSCIO, supra note 117, at 65.
121. Douglas W. Rae, Two Cheers for Very Unequal Incomes: Toward Social Justice in
Central Cities, in 18 JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 105-06 (Clarissa Rile Hayward
& Todd Swanstrom eds., 2011).
122. See S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel, Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 724-25 (1975).
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provide amenity-based “bribes” aimed at mobile taxpayers: arts districts,
restaurants, museums. For existing residents, projects that are aimed at
increasing a neighborhood’s desirability to a certain demographic look like
an exercise in gentrification. At the same time, moving the poor out of
certain neighborhoods—deconcentrating poverty—requires a high level of
coercion and often destabilizes those neighborhoods.123
Regional revenue-sharing to provide necessary infrastructure certainly
makes a great deal of sense, as do other regional policies that promote and
encourage residential and educational desegregation. But the policies that
the new regional government will adopt are likely to emphasize businessfriendliness at the cost of significant redistribution.
In sum, regionalism may provide more resources to cash-starved local
governments and that is all to the good. But regionalism does not alter the
relative powers of cities and the market. Even in a redrawn metro, the
political economy of the region will likely remain unchanged. Wherever the
boundaries are drawn, urban areas in the city are likely to be at a distinct
political and economic disadvantage. And the city—even one with expanded
boundaries—will remain constrained.
III. [RE]CONCEIVING THE CITY
Home rule, national urban policy, and regionalism operate within the
existing framework of the market economy and three-tiered federal system.
These approaches to city power seek to increase the city’s access to resources
and enable the city to use them while limiting central interference.
This Part considers more radical reform proposals—ones that challenge
both market primacy and the existing distribution of power. Radical
critiques of the existing market order treat the city as a central site for
democratic participation and economic justice. In these accounts, the city is
not only a jurisdiction and a physical form, but a political concept—
providing a form of organization that can arguably address the democratic
and economic deficits of the existing liberal democratic nation-state. Critics
of city weakness evoke Aristotle’s polis: the city as synonymous with the
concept of political partnership or self-governance. Proponents argue that
city power is an essential mechanism for reforming the market structures that
engender inequality and that limit citizens’ political and economic
freedom.124
This Part briefly summarizes three of these accounts: the critical legal city,
the right to the city, and the solidarity economy. Each account offers a

123. On mobility schemes generally, see discussion infra Section III.C.
124. See discussion infra Part IV.
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structural critique of the existing market-based, liberal economic order. Each
account also struggles with similar difficulties of implementation.
A.

The Critical Legal City

Consider first the critical literature on the legal city, led by Gerald Frug’s
work on the city as a legal concept. 125 Writing against a backdrop of
Marxian challenges to rights-based liberalism, Frug argues that the city’s
weakness is a function of a liberal ideology that suppresses alternative forms
of collective power. In the act of bifurcating the state and the individual—
the former exercising power and the latter exercising rights—classical
liberalism undermined and ultimately rejected the city as an independent
source of collective authority.126
According to Frug, this story started with the medieval city and its status
as an intermediate corporate entity, combining features of the state and the
market. It ended with the reification of a new distinction between private
rights-holders and governments.
Though municipal and business
corporations were originally undifferentiated, the business corporation was
ultimately understood to be entitled to private rights—namely, the right of
property. The municipal corporation, by contrast, was reconceived as a
threat to the exercise of private rights.
This differentiation took place over the course of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, as the municipal corporation evolved from a
territorially-based trading corporation designed to protect member
merchants’ and tradesmen’s prerogatives, to a political jurisdiction charged
with protecting and advancing the health, safety, and welfare of its
populace.127 The medieval city, which enjoyed a certain amount of political
independence from both the Crown and Church, was replaced with the
municipal corporation. And the municipal corporation became an
administrative arm of the state.
Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for this dramatic shift.
Some argue that republican ideology played a role—the medieval and early
colonial municipal corporation was vulnerable to the same political winds
that produced the American Revolution.
The closed municipal
corporation—like other hierarchical, aristocratic, and nondemocratic
institutions—had to be brought under democratic control. The new
economic thinking of Adam Smith and the developing notion of free markets

125. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1980).
126. See id.
127. For one of the most important accounts of this transformation, with particular
emphasis on New York City, see generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870 (1989).
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also influenced the change, as did the far longer historical movement from
status to contract and the rise of the liberal legal order.128 The shift away
from collectivism toward individual autonomy, with its language of human
rights, made it necessary to reconfigure institutions that were neither state
nor individual.129
Frug tells a more critical story, arguing that the demise of city power was
a function of the rise of the centralizing state coupled with an emphasis on
property rights over collective rights of self-government. 130 Frug further
argues that the emerging rights-based liberalism had no room for
intermediate entities between the state and the individual, because those
entities were too much of a threat to the power exercised by each.131 And so
the city was assimilated to the state, while the private business corporation
and other associational entities were assimilated to the individual.132
As Frug points out, the municipal corporation’s economic power was the
chief casualty of this bifurcation.133 Once the medieval and early-colonial
city no longer maintained a monopoly on trade, vocations, and the selling
and buying of goods, the city had to establish a new relationship with
commercial activity in order to control the capital necessary to sustain it.134
In the United States, the bulk of that work was done by classical jurists
and reformers concerned about the relationship between legislatures and
economic favoritism more broadly. 135 Classical late-nineteenth-century
legal thinkers worried that legislatures were inclined to favor certain groups
in the marketplace over others. In the arena of municipal law, cities were
actively engaged in what classical legal thinkers saw as economic
favoritism—the distribution of exclusive franchises and monopolies and the
use of public power to promote private gain.136 Therefore, these thinkers
saw judicial oversight as necessary to ensure that legislation was in the public

128. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, 25-35, 57-59 (1975).
129. See id. See also JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA, 1870-1900, 29-34, 57-59 (1984) (discussing how aldermen and comptrollers in
growing cities adapted their roles to serve their communities).
130. See FRUG, supra note 16, at 39-45 (1999).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); G. Edward White, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). See FRUG, supra note 16, at 40-45. See also
HARTOG, supra note 127, at 2-4 (expressing skepticism towards the public nature of municipal
governments).
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interest.137 They also pushed for limits on municipal power as necessary to
protect the fundamental right of all free persons to enter into markets or
participate in avocations on an equal basis.138
This legal invention of the disempowered city was essential to the creation
of our existing capitalist, market-centered legal order, according to Frug.
That legal order assumes the bifurcation of market and state and prevents
each from entering the sphere of the other, making it seem the “natural” and
“obvious” way to organize political and economic life.
Critical legal theorists have long targeted that necessitarian logic.139 Frug
draws on these critiques to reject the weak city, arguing that true democratic
freedom requires empowering an intermediate association that is neither
state nor market, but enjoys characteristics of both. For Frug, city power
would help dismantle a liberalism that favors capital over collectives and
private corporate power over public democratic freedom.140
Operationalizing such a profound revolution in our legal and economic
sensibilities is difficult. Frug admits that market-based liberalism is not
going away anytime soon and that his vision of an empowered city is
utopian.141 So he starts small, suggesting municipal ownership of productive
assets such as banks and insurance companies.142 The municipal operation
of commercial enterprises is a conceivable way to challenge the market/state
distinction. City ownership of the instruments of corporate finance can bring
markets under popular democratic control—the goal of an empowered city
strategy.
How transformative this strategy can be is a real question. But
importantly, Frug conceptualizes city power as central to the project, not just
incidental to some other set of policy goals.143 As he writes:
We can transform society as much or as little as we want in order to begin
the process of making the city an alternative form of decentralized power
in our society. We can accept all, part, or none of the market system and
the welfare state. But real power must be given to cities.144

137. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 449-50
(5th ed. 1911). See generally Richard McCormick, The Discovery that Business Corrupts
Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247 (1981).
138. See DILLON, supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1998); ROBERTO UNGER,
THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
140. See generally FRUG, supra note 16, at 9-13; cf. Stahl, supra note 16, at 219-40
(deploying a Marxian critique of home rule).
141. See FRUG, supra note 16, at 214-16.
142. Id.
143. See generally Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, supra note 125.
144. Id. at 1149-50.
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In this way, Frug’s critical project is adamantly city-centered. City power
is not incidental to the project of recreating the existing economic and
political order. It is essential to that project’s success.
B.

The Right to the City

The city as the locus of transformative reform is also at the heart of “the
right to the city,” a concept developed by the pioneering French sociologist
Henri Lefebvre in the late 1960s145 and recently revived by a diverse set of
urban-based political movements.146 Those who invoke the right to the city
assert an individual liberty to access urban resources, to avoid spatial
segregation and exclusion, and to be provided with public services that meet
basic needs in health, education, and welfare.147 The right to the city, as
some have used it, is also an assertion of a fundamentally public right to
certain territories and a resistance to the privatization of urban space.148 The
right to the city has been invoked to challenge the exclusionary
developmental processes that have shaped metropolitan areas worldwide.
These include segregation, slum clearance, urban renewal, urban decline,
and gentrification.149
These types of claims have been mostly asserted by anti-poverty
advocates in response to the rapid pace of global urbanization. Dramatic

145. See generally HENRI LEFEBVRE, LE DROIT À LA VILLE (1968); HENRI LEFEBVRE,
WRITINGS ON CITIES (Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth Lebas eds. and trans., 1996). For a
discussion, see generally Mark Purcell, Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its
Urban Politics of the Inhabitant, 58 GEO. J. 99 (2002).
146. See Purcell, supra note 145.
147. See DANIEL MOECKLI, EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC SPACE: A COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 415-16 (2016); EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE
(2010); RIGHT TO THE CITY ALLIANCE, WE CALL THESE PROJECTS HOME: SOLVING THE
HOUSING CRISIS FROM THE GROUND UP, 2, 4 (2010), http://righttothecity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/We_Call_These_Projects_Home-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ALB59D9X].
148. See, e.g., DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR
PUBLIC SPACE (2003).
149. See, e.g., Niels Boeing, The Urban Revolution, WE-MAGAZINE, April 2010, at 111,
reprinted in Introduction to Recht auf Stadt Hamburg, http://wiki.rechtaufstadt.net/
index.php/Introduction_to_Recht_auf_Stadt_Hamburg
[https://perma.cc/VPZ2-JR5R]
(discussing Germany’s Recht Auf Stadt, which grew out of a 2009 demonstration in
Hamburg); Marie Hurchzermeyer, Invoking Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the City’ in South Africa
Today: A Response to Walsh, 18 CITY 41 (2014); A Short History of Abahlali baseMjondolo,
the Durban Shack Dwellers’ Movement (Oct. 2006), http://abahlali.org/a-short-history-ofabahlali-basemjondolo-the-durban-shack-dwellers-movement
[https://perma.cc/AD3M69F6] (discussing South Africa’s Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shack dwellers movement begun
in 2005); About, RIGHT TO THE CITY ALLIANCE, http://righttothecity.org/about/missionhistory/ [https://perma.cc/A2RN-XR6D] (discussing the United States’ Right to the City
Alliance, launched in 2007). See also Margit Mayer, The “Right to the City” in Urban Social
Movements, in CITIES FOR PEOPLE NOT FOR PROFIT: CRITICAL URBAN THEORY AND THE RIGHT
TO THE CITY (Neil Brenner, et al. eds., 2012).
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inequality in the mega-cities of the developing world has given rise to violent
disputes over access to land, municipal services, and public space.150 The
right to the city has also been linked to international protest movements like
Occupy Wall Street that first appeared in developed countries.151
Advocates use the language of rights to lay claim to the city as a social
and political collective. The idea of a claim on the city—a legal entitlement
to it—is more than an affirmative social welfare right. As influential Marxist
urbanist David Harvey argues, the right to the city is “far more than a right
of individual or group access to the resources that the city embodies . . . it is
a collective rather than individual right.”152 It encompasses the idea that
individuals have idiosyncratic, non-monetizable stakes in neighborhoods
and in the city as a whole that should be recognized. In other words,
individuals have a right not just to the exchange value of land but to its use
value as well—not just to buy and sell urban land, build or tear down
buildings, or invest capital—but also to enjoy the city’s non-commodifiable,
public goods of sociability, society, and community. This entitlement can
be operationalized as a right to stable tenure regardless of one’s resources.
In addition, the right to the city suggests that individuals should have equal
access to communal processes that create wealth, because the city is itself a
product of those processes. Harvey argues that “to claim a right to the
city . . . is to claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of
urbanization.”153 Edward Soja elaborates:
Lefebvre saw the normal workings of everyday urban life as
generating . . . inequitable and unjust distributions of social resources
across the space of the city. Demanding greater access to . . . valued
resources by those most disadvantaged by inequitable and unjust
geographies defined the struggle to reclaim the manifold rights to the city.
The aim, at least from the liberal egalitarian point of view, is to gain greater
control over the forces shaping urban space . . . to reclaim democracy from
those who have been using it to maintain their advantaged positions.154

Like Frug’s argument for city power, the right to the city is a claim to
appropriate democratic control over the political and social processes that
constitute urbanization. Marxist theorists like Harvey invoke this idea by

150. See Melanie Lombard & Carole Rakodi, Urban Land Conflict in the Global South:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 53 URB. STUD. 2683, 2684-87 (2016); WORLD BANK,
Violence in the City: Understanding and Supporting Community Responses to Urban
Violence, 26-27 (2011), https://www.unicef.org/protection/Violence_in_the_City.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8WM-6BTD].
151. DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN
REVOLUTION, 1-25, 163 (2012).
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id. at 5.
154. SOJA, supra note 147, at 96.
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challenging the existing capitalist order.155 But the right to the city can also
be used in a more limited way to challenge existing political and social
arrangements that exclude or marginalize, namely those development
processes that favor the wealthy over the poor.
The right to the city has been difficult to realize, however, in large part
because it is invoked across so many contexts. In some ways it is a defensive
right—a right not to be expropriated or displaced by predatory development
policies. It is also an affirmative right to gain from the wealth generated by
the city. The argument for “spatial justice”156 partakes of both of these ideas.
Proponents argue that land-based private development constrains the
public’s rights to the collective value of the city, and regularly isolates,
excludes, and restricts particular groups or classes of individuals from
asserting this right.157
This spatial approach—embodied in “occupy-style” protests that assert
literal and symbolic territorial claims—is utterly foreign to the current
market-based orthodoxy. Market-based local government assumes that a
combination of property rights and (generally) free markets generate the
patterns of metropolitan-area development that result. On this view, the city
is a neutral background against which individual property owners act—no
more than a legal jurisdiction in which individuals who already hold rights
exchange entitlements. Urbanization and the wealth it produces are thus
primarily a market process, not a political one.
The right to the city asserts otherwise. It challenges the politics of
urbanization, not just its economics. This politics favors transnational
corporations over local communities, wealthy new arrivals over the existing
poor, competition over solidarity, development over stable tenure. At root,
the right to the city is an anti-poverty movement, but it is also an assertion
of a more egalitarian urban politics—a claim to the city as a place of
collective ownership.
C.

The Solidarity Economy

A similar dissatisfaction with the inequitable results of urban development
is reflected in critiques of liberal urban policy. Critics charge that currentday anti-poverty policies have failed to address underlying structural

155. See HARVEY, supra note 151, at 115.
156. SOJA, supra note 147.
157. Id. See also HARVEY, supra note 151, at 22-23 (“[S]ince the urban process is a major
channel of [surplus] use . . . then the right to the city is constituted by establishing democratic
control over the deployment of the surpluses through urbanization.”); Richard Thompson
Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1841, 1844-47 (1994).
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inequalities that are endemic to global capitalism and that the tax and
redistribute program is insufficient to resolve those inequalities.
David Imbroscio’s work is a recent example. Imbroscio argues that the
standard progressive reform agenda is inadequate to the task of solving the
deep problems of urban poverty. 158 That reform agenda, he contends, is
characterized by a “meritocratic paradigm”—an approach to urban poverty
that seeks to address barriers in the social environment that prevent the poor
from reaching their full potential. 159 These efforts are geared toward
providing individuals the resources to overcome the disadvantages of
inadequate schooling, troubled families, and poverty-impacted
neighborhoods.160 But, according to Imbroscio, these policies miss the point
entirely: by focusing on equality of opportunity, liberals misidentify the
source of urban poverty as inadequate social services or weak social ties,
when the origins of economic inequality run much deeper. 161 Imbroscio
agrees that resources are inequitably distributed, but he disagrees that the
goal of liberal policy should be to afford individuals in poor places the ability
to achieve upward mobility by “dint of their own merit.”162 American urban
policy should instead be geared toward restructuring an economy that
produces a few “merit-worthy” winners and a large number of losers.163
Imbroscio makes two claims. The first claim is that liberal policymakers
are too enamored of a set of “uplift” policies that have not been proven to
work. 164 The second claim is that these policies are targeted toward
individual mobility and thus underappreciate the need for community-wide
economic strategies that can address structural economic disparities.165 He
contends that current policies geared toward increasing individual
opportunity are not going reverse the broad economic trends of the twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries and to expect them to do so only reinforces
existing inequalities.
Education policy is Imbroscio’s first example. 166 As he notes, school
reform has been viewed as a solution to poor, stagnant urban economies for
at least half a century and yet “we see over and over the inability of various
reform efforts to achieve much achievement in poor children’s schooling.”167

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See generally Imbroscio, supra note 16.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 80-93.
Id. at 93-95.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 83.
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In the current economy, even those who do attain a college education—and
it is precious few—are not guaranteed success. Imbroscio cites statistics
showing that those who start below the poverty line tend to stay there,
regardless of their educational attainments.168 And he cites further data that
shows that people who start in the middle class and do attain college
degrees—while doing better than those who do not—also fall out of the
middle class in very high numbers.169
Imbroscio also challenges the efficacy of programs that seek to correct for
family and neighborhood dysfunction, arguing that these interventions only
have modest effects on social mobility rates.170 Early childhood intervention
policies, for example, do not seem to generate great gains in social mobility
over time, even if they may help some individual students achieve greater
success.
The same is true of policies that seek to move people out of their existing
neighborhoods or disperse poverty through the creation of mixed-income
communities. Imbroscio argues that such policies—like the “Moving to
Opportunity” program that gives families vouchers to relocate to lower
poverty neighborhoods—have shown at best mixed results. 171 He also
observes that for most residents of poor neighborhoods, relocation is not
desirable or even feasible.172 Mobility policies underappreciate the value
and importance of human attachments to family, home, neighborhood, and
community. 173 But more importantly, such policies are impractical and
inhumane to implement on a large scale. Even moving relatively large
numbers of families out of poor neighborhoods would have only slight
effects on overall social mobility rates.
In short, Imbroscio argues that addressing poverty by reducing
opportunity barriers is simply not a viable long-term strategy. Drawing on
Thomas Piketty’s path-breaking work on inequality,174 Imbroscio observes
that the widespread social mobility that characterized mid-century western
nations seems to have passed. As he writes: “the meritocratic dream at the
heart of liberal urban policy seems doomed at least for the foreseeable
future.”175 And so, “[r]ather than being designed to produce high rates of
social mobility for meritorious individuals, the key aspiration [of social

168. Id. at 83-84.
169. Id. at 84-85.
170. Id. at 88.
171. Id. at 90.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 92.
174. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Harv. U.
Press 2014).
175. Imbroscio, supra note 16, at 94.
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welfare policy] must instead be the uplift of entire urban communities.”176
Imbroscio calls this emphasis the “solidarity economy,” 177 which he
distinguishes from a competitive economy that focuses on rewarding
achievement.
The solidarity economy strives to create local, stable economies in place.
Instead of embarking on a “massive sociospatial reordering of the urban
population,” 178 Imbroscio advocates “community-based development
institutions, worker-owned firms, publicly-controlled businesses, and webs
of interdependent (locally networked) entrepreneurial enterprises”—all of
which will “generate indigenous, stable and balanced economic growth in
local economies.”179 These efforts are directed toward struggling inner-city
communities; the idea is not to relocate poor people to new neighborhoods,
but to give them the resources to gain economic security where they are.
Imbroscio advocates a populist localism. The response to the dislocations
caused by globalization is to reconstruct the economy on a local and less
vulnerable scale. The goal is to counter global corporate capitalism with
community economic development and to provide for the city’s economic
and civic independence from the strictures of global finance.
As Imbroscio points out, this constructive form of economic populism is
necessitated by the failure of the existing meritocratic regime to address
economic stagnation. The individual opportunity and mobility strategy is
too weak to counter the forces of transnational capital mobility and accumulation. According to Imbroscio, the meritocratic paradigm has not only failed
African American inner-city residents, but has also disappointed many
downwardly mobile white middle-class Americans. The rise of ethnic
nationalism on the right and anti-corporate populism on the left is a
symptom.180
To be sure, cities are easily coopted by corporate forces. Locals’ capacity
to assert independence from global markets is questionable. For that reason,

Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
IMBROSCIO, supra note 117, at 9. See also GAR ALPEROVITZ, AMERICA BEYOND
CAPITALISM (Democracy Collaborative Press 2nd ed., 2011); MICHAEL SHUMAN, GOING
LOCAL: CREATING SELF-RELIANT COMMUNITIES IN A GLOBAL AGE (Routledge 2000); THAD
WILLIAMSON ET AL., MAKING A PLACE FOR COMMUNITY: LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN A GLOBAL
ERA (Routledge 2002).
180. Chuck McCutcheon, Populism and Party Politics, 26 CQ RESEARCHER 721, 724
(2016) (“The left- and right-wing versions of American populism have different orientations.
Left-leaning populists seek to check the power of banks and big business . . . . Populists on
the political right, meanwhile, direct their frustration at the government, arguing it favors
undeserving groups over ordinary Americans — often minorities or foreigners . . . .”). See
also Richard Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the
Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920−1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (2005).
176.
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critics of liberal urban policy like Imbroscio often embrace municipal or
local ownership of productive assets and institutions. Indeed, the theme of
public or municipal ownership runs through each of the critical accounts of
the existing market economy. Progressive-Era reformers also encouraged
municipal ownership, as a similar demand for public control over the
instruments of economic development informed that movement.
IV. CITY POWER
Advocates of city power, the right to the city, and the solidarity economy
are responding to the seeming dominance of global capital in the twenty-first
century. An abiding theme of these critiques of market-based liberalism is
the lack of democratic control over the scope, scale, and terms of economic
growth and decline. Cities are the visible manifestations of this democracy
deficit. The hollowed-out shell of Detroit can be contrasted with the
gleaming residential towers of Manhattan. In both instances, global market
processes have bypassed a significant portion of the populace. Resistance to
the market—whether it is disinvesting or overinvesting—seems futile.
Theorists writing in a critical mode champion city power by way of
reimagining certain basic liberal commitments. Frug challenges the
market/state distinction; Marxist theorists seek a revolutionary urban
politics; economic localists reject the equal opportunity gospel. In all these
cases, however, the likelihood of a radical shift away from the current
market-based orthodoxy seems remote.
The urban resurgence of the last decades, however, suggests a way
forward, as it teaches two lessons that undercut the assumptions of capital
mobility and city subservience. First, the urban resurgence calls into
question the competitive model of urban growth and decline. Cities do not
“compete” themselves into urban success—the causes of city success or
failure are complicated and not easily attributable to particular capitalfavoring policies. If that is true, then we can reverse the assumption that
capital calls the tune and that cities must sing it.
Second, if we take that reversal seriously, it suggests that cities have the
capacity to engage in social welfare redistribution and other policies that are
not directly responsive to the demands of mobile capital. It may also be
possible for the city’s economic power to translate into political power,
though that is less assured in light of the constraints of U.S. state-based
federalism.
A.

A New Urban Economics

The first step is to challenge the competitive account of city growth and
decline. Recall that the ideology and practice of market-based local
government presumes that cities are in a global competition for mobile
capital and that any given city’s success or failure will turn on its capacity to
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attract and retain it. But this competitive paradigm is theoretical. The idea
of the “limited city” might not be accurate if social welfare policies do not
precipitate capital flight or if there is little or no connection between marketfriendly policies and economic growth.
In fact, the reasons for city growth or decline are complex, and not often
attributable to policy. Standard explanations of urban development tend to
emphasize technological or demographic change, not tax or expenditure
policies. For example, even well-governed cities declined in the face of
deindustrialization during the middle part of the twentieth century.181
More importantly, the urban rebound of the last twenty years does not
appear to have been caused by any particular capital attraction and retention
policies. Urban resurgence is a global phenomenon. Cities have become
more prosperous whether or not local officials pursued neo-liberal market
policies or did something else. In the last twenty years, none of the U.S.
cities that have now seen their populations stabilize and their property values
increase moved to reduce local tax rates or regulations so substantially as to
eliminate the city-suburb differential.182 Nor have those rebounding cities
demonstrably improved particular city services. Urban schools, for example,
have not gotten measurably better when compared to their suburban
counterparts.183 And whether a city is “business-friendly” or has low taxes

181. See Glaeser, supra note 27, at 22, 25-26.
182. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17, at 194-97.
183. See A DECADE OF URBAN SCHOOL REFORM: PERSISTENCE AND PROGRESS IN THE
BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS 133-34 (S. Paul Reville & Celine Coggins eds., 2007); G. Alfred
Hess Jr., Understanding Achievement (and Other) Changes under Chicago School Reform,
21 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y ANALYSIS 67, 79-80 (1999); Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti,
Introduction, in CITY SCHOOLS: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK 1, 3-5 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P.
Viteritti eds., 2000); Sam Dillon, Large Urban-Suburban Gap Seen in Graduation Rates,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A14; CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, CLOSING THE GRADUATION
GAP: EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES (2009),
https://secure.edweek.org/media/cities_in_crisis_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFD3-KLNS]
(comparing graduation rates in the principal school systems of the country’s fifty largest cities
with nearby suburban communities for the period 1995–2005). See also Micere Keels et al.,
The Effects of Gentrification on Neighborhood Public Schools, 12 CITY & CMTY. 238 (2013)
(Providing a thorough review of the literature on urban resurgence and public school
education, and finding no aggregate academic benefit from gentrification, with possible
negative effects on underprivileged children in Chicago. According to some studies, a clear
negative relationship exists between the process of gentrification and the overall experience
of local public school students.). See, e.g., Tomeka Davis & Deirdre Oakley, Linking Charter
School Emergence to Urban Revitalization and Gentrification, 35 J. URB. AFF. 81, 85 (2013).
For an account of the link between urban renewal and urban school revitalization in
Philadelphia, see Maia Cucchiara, Re-branding Urban Schools: Urban Revitalization, Social
Status, and Marketing Public Schools to the Upper Middle Class, 23 J. EDUC. POL’Y 165
(2008). See also Kristen A. Graham, Near-broke Phila. Schools Must Borrow to Make
Payroll, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 22, 2015, at A1; Joshua Rosenblat & Tanner Howard, How
Gentrification is Leaving Public Schools Behind, U.S. NEWS, (Feb. 20, 2015)
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/20/how-gentrification-is-leaving-public-
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and low regulatory burdens does not predict growth,184 even if city boosters
claim otherwise.
Resurgent cities have, in fact, not done anything starkly different from
what they had been doing for the past seventy-five years to attract young
people and suburbanites to the urban core. Massive investments in urban
renewal, highway building, stadiums, and showplaces did not slow the
decline of post-industrial cities in the middle and latter part of the twentieth
century. The relatively minor investments in cities at the turn of the twentyfirst century appear to be an unlikely cause for cities’ more recent successes.
So what explains the urban resurgence? The conventional market model
assumes that capital is hyper-mobile and that cities must compete to attract
it. Because capital can flee, local governments have a limited range of policy
options. In particular, they have limited ability to adopt social welfare
redistribution and regulations that appear hostile to corporate capital. The
urban resurgence, however, suggests that the relationship between capital
and the city moves in the opposite direction. One can flip the assumption
about who is competing for what. Instead of the city competing for capital,
capital is competing for cities.
This idea is not so strange. Technology firms compete to be in San
Francisco. Finance firms compete to be in London. Young, educated
workers compete to be in Manhattan and so do corporate headquarters. This
competition is evident in the high rents that these residents and businesses
are willing to pay. As any realtor will tell you, “location, location, location.”
In other words, the view that capital and labor are endlessly mobile is
incorrect.185 The competitive theory of city growth and decline assumes a
relatively flat world, in which jurisdictions compete on an even playing field.
Economic geographers, however, have shown that this is not true. 186
Economic activity is not spread evenly over geographic space. Some places

schools-behind [https://perma.cc/7NYH-3CFP] (discussing gentrification’s effect on public
schools in Washington D.C.).
184. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17 at 191-217. See also, Terry F. Buss, The
Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An
Overview of the Literature, 15 ECON. DEV. Q. 90, 97-99 (2001); Yoonsoo Lee, Geographical
Redistribution of U.S. Manufacturing and the Role of State Development Policy, 64 J. URB.
ECON. 436-47, 445 (2008); Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, U.S. and E.U. Experiences of Tax
Incentives, 39 AREA 186, 189-90 (2007) (reviewing literature).
185. See MARIO POLÈSE, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF REGIONS: WHY CITIES MATTER 5455 (2009); WORLD BANK, 2009 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: RESHAPING ECONOMIC
GEOGRAPHY 50-52 (2009); K.R. Cox, The Local and the Global in the New Urban Politics:
A Critical View, 11 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 433, 437-41 (1993).
186. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 17, at 34-40.
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will always have more economic activity and some will have less.187 Often
those with less will decline even when their costs are lower, while those with
more will continue to advance despite their comparative cost disadvantage.
Location matters to persons and firms—the flow of workers or businesses
into or out of a particular jurisdiction is not simply a question of which
jurisdiction has lower costs. Economists have shown that dense, rich places
often get denser and richer while sparse, poor places get less populated and
poorer. 188 Being in the right location appears to offer myriad economic
advantages.189 Capital and labor need cities as much as cities need capital
and labor.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, cities have reasserted their
historical advantages as providers of the infrastructure, markets, and labor
pools that generate growth. 190 Cities seem to thrive in an economy
increasingly dominated by knowledge-based industries—such as
information technology—where informal face-to-face communication is
understood as essential. Cities are centers of innovation and appear to be
necessary for the intra- and cross- industry exchange of ideas. But cities also
seem to be thriving simply because they are denser and contain more people,
jobs, and opportunities for social, economic, and political interaction than do
suburbs and exurban jurisdictions.191
Market-based theories of local government need to attribute the success
or failure of cities to some policy change. If “competition” between cities is
to mean anything, the city must exercise some level of agency—some
capacity to control its economic fate. But it is likely that city growth and
decline is cyclical and only indirectly connected with any particular local tax
and spend policy. The processes by which twenty-first century cities have
become larger and more important are not reducible to inter-city competition
and cannot be attributed to any particular set of urban policies. Competition
does not induce growth—other forces are at work.
Indeed, the inability to predict economic growth and decline should make
scholars and policymakers wary of claims that capital-attracting policies are
at play. Recall that in 1950 many believed that Detroit would become the

187. On uneven economic development, see WORLD BANK, supra note 185, at 8. See also
PIERRE-PHILIPPE COMBES ET AL., ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: THE INTEGRATION OF REGIONS AND
NATIONS 365 (2008).
188. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 61-73 (Blackwell Publishers,
eds., 1st ed. 1996); WORLD BANK, supra note 185, at 50-52.
189. See Edward W. Soja, Beyond Postmetropolis, 32 URB. GEO. 451 (2011).
190. See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION
MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (MacMillan eds., 2011).
191. See, e.g., POLÈSE supra note 185; Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J.
POL. ECON. 1126, 1127 (1992); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic
Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 38-39 (1988).
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biggest and most influential city in the United States. In the early 1970s,
prognosticators predicted New York City’s rapid and inevitable decline.192
How any given city will experience the economic cycle is not easily
predictable. That fact should disabuse policymakers of the notion that if
cities just adopted the right capital-favoring policies, all will be right.
If growth and decline are much less susceptible to policy than
conventional accounts assert, then cities are much less constrained to adopt
capital-favoring policies in order to succeed.193 In the large number of cases,
such policies will not do much good.194 And adopting contrary policies will
not do much harm. Rather than an observation of fact, the argument that
cities are competing is an assertion used by certain political interests to
advance their own aims, regardless of the effects of the particular policies
that they support.
B.

A New Urban Politics

The difficulty of predicting city growth or decline leads to the second
lesson of the urban resurgence: the city’s assumed limits are less economic
than political. The proliferation of metropolitan-area local governments and
the subsidization of suburban flight are not economic facts, but political
ones. Disinvestment from central cities in the mid-twentieth century was
hastened by the federal support for suburban development, segregationist
housing policies, and Supreme Court decisions that limited the reach of
school desegregation. That local government borders are porous and that
local governments have to fund their services with what they earn in

192. See MICHAEL STORPER, KEYS TO THE CITY: HOW ECONOMICS, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL
INTERACTIONS, AND POLITICS SHAPES DEVELOPMENT 1 (Princeton Univ. Press eds., 2013). On
Detroit, see Jack Lessenberry, City That Put World on Wheels Now a Bleak, Urban Disaster,
TOLEDO BLADE (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.toledoblade.com/JackLessenberry/2011/03/25/
City-that-put-world-on-wheels-now-a-bleak-urban-disaster.html
[https://perma.cc/8D733ZZY] (“When Detroit formally celebrated its founding that summer, city fathers
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Bill McGraw, A Different Time: When Detroit Believed It Was the Greatest City, DEADLINE
DETROIT (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/4081/looking_back_on_
the_week_detroit_reached_its_all-time_peak [https://perma.cc/R8H8-ED8G]. On New York
City, see JEROME KRASE & JUDITH N. DESENA, RACE, CLASS AND GENTRIFICATION IN
BROOKLYN: A VIEW FROM THE STREET (Lexington Books eds., 2016); JEROME KRASE, SELF
AND COMMUNITY IN THE CITY (Univ. Press of Am. eds., 1982) (describing the 1975 predictions
of Eleanor Holmes Norton).
193. Indeed, evidence suggests that cities have much more divergent redistributive policies
than one would predict based on the competitive model. See Craw, supra note 28;
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 28.
194. See Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does Competition for Capital Discipline
Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 817,
817-18 (2005) (arguing that competition has a polarizing effect, causing cities that are unable
to attract mobile capital to abandon business-friendly policies in favor of predation or the
interests of existing citizens).
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jurisdictionally-local tax dollars is a function of political organization.195
State officials’ “selective localism” is similarly a function of political
organization. The formal division of authority between local, state, and
federal governments and the vertical competition between officials who
represent “local” constituents are a product of U.S. state-based federalism.
These aspects of state power are a political reality: the states are not going
away anytime soon.
But urbanization is a reality too. And growing metropolitan regions are
changing state-level political dynamics.
For example, cities and
metropolitan areas in traditionally rural and southern states are generating a
new political calculus as increasingly diverse, young, educated, and
progressive voters migrate to urban places.196
More importantly, accepting that growth can neither be hastened by
“business-friendly” policies nor readily retarded by “redistributive” ones
opens up a larger array of urban policy options.197 Cities have more freedom
to pursue certain social welfare and anti-discrimination objectives. These
objectives expose the widening rift between urban political constituencies
and rural or exurban ones. Conflicts between cities and their states and
between cities and the federal government are likely to increase, at least in
the short term.
The municipal living wage movement is a good example, both of cities’
political capacities and of states’ often hostile response. According to the
conventional account, local minimum wage laws are a bad idea. Economists
are suspicious of municipal wage floors, worrying that under such a law,
195. See generally Macedo, supra note 182.
196. See Karen L. Cox, Op-Ed, A New Southern Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/opinion/sunday/a-new-southern-strategy.html
[https://perma.cc/3T3C-CP5B] (“If Charlotte or Atlanta were the size of New York City, then
perhaps we wouldn’t tag either North Carolina or Georgia as red states.”); Joel Kotkin, How
the South Will Rise to Power Again, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
joelkotkin/2013/01/31/how-the-south-will-rise-to-power-again
[https://perma.cc/8EPSY4ZL] (“The South’s new breed of carpetbaggers increasingly bring diplomas, skills and high
wage jobs with them. The main attraction: not only jobs, but lower housing prices, lower
taxes and, overall, a more affordable quality of life.”). North Carolina is a good example.
HB2, the “bathroom bill,” became a point of contention in the 2016 gubernatorial election.
The business community generally opposed the bill and its unpopularity contributed to the
ouster of the conservative governor. See Jonathan M. Katz, Major Companies Press North
Carolina on Law Curbing Protections from Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/north-carolina-governor-attacks-critics-of-lawcurbing-protections-from-bias.html [https://perma.cc/BQ3J-8Q72]. There have been a
number of failed efforts to repeal HB2, most recently after Charlotte rescinded its transgender
ordinance with the expectation that the legislature would back repeal. See Jim Morrill & Steve
Harrison, Gov. Pat McCrory Calls for Special Legislative Session Wednesday to Repeal HB2,
THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/
article121729973.html [https://perma.cc/4Y3T-3KFZ].
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employers would reduce hiring or move out of the jurisdiction altogether.198
Therefore, they argue that cities cannot regulate wages without generating
capital flight.199 Only centralized governments can effectively adopt wage
floors.200
The recent living wage movement, however, has tested those claims.
Cities were the first governments to adopt significant wage hikes, and those
cities have not seen a massive outflow of capital and jobs.201 Evidence also
shows that higher minimum wages reduce urban poverty.202 The success of
municipal living wage laws has induced some states to adopt higher
minimums and is putting pressure on federal elected officials to follow
suit.203 What is now a national minimum wage movement had little political
traction until cities adopted their own wage floors in the mid-2000s. In
addition, cities have become important sites for organizing low-wage
workers in the healthcare, hospitality, and service industries 204 and for
pursuing a whole range of worker-favorable policies.
Of course, as previously noted, the city’s ability to adopt and protect its
own laws is significantly limited. Conservative state legislatures have
aggressively preempted local wage, anti-discrimination, housing, and social
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welfare laws adopted by more progressive-minded cities.205 Over twenty
states have adopted laws preempting local minimum wage ordinances.206
Indeed, the current political environment is quite hostile to cities. City
constituencies tend to be more politically progressive, but conservatives hold
power in the majority of state houses and in the U.S. Congress, and more
recently took over the American presidency. Donald Trump has attacked socalled “sanctuary cities”—cities that provide identification cards and other
services for undocumented workers or that refuse to assist federal authorities
in enforcing federal immigration laws. He has threatened to cut their receipt
of federal funds if they do not assist with federal immigration
enforcement.207 A number of mayors have declared that they will resist,
though the costs of such resistance could be significant.208 American cities
do not now have an ally in the Oval Office, or in any of the branches of the
federal government, and they have few allies in the states.
Nevertheless, the periphery’s influence on the center shifts over time.
Like economic cycles, political cycles are difficult to predict. The centripetal
forces of the twentieth century are still at work in the twenty-first. But there
are emergent counter-forces. For critics of the existing market-based
political order, city power may be able to serve as a counterweight both to
global corporate capital and the increasingly distant nation-state. As
conservative attacks on liberal democracy reveal popular dissatisfaction with
the status quo, locating an alternative and more accessible site for economic
and political participation seems ever more urgent. That site can (and for
many, should) be the city. The rise of urban-based political movements
suggests that city power is a political possibility even as it faces significant
opposition by those committed to state power in the service of global capital.
CONCLUSION
Cities operate in a market economy that privileges private economic
interests and a constitutional structure that places cities at the bottom of a
hierarchy of governments. For most of the latter half of the twentieth
century, American cities were decidedly subordinate to both mobile capital
and to more central government officials, in both theory and in practice. At
the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a subtle shift—central

205. See Greenblatt, supra note 10.
206. See Bill Kramer, Multistate Insider, Localities Challenging State Preemption Laws,
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cities have gained ground and economic activity is increasingly centered in
metropolitan areas.
To be sure, the U.S. political culture is still characterized by a fervent antiurbanism.209 Declining cities like Flint are taken over with little fanfare.
Legislators preempt local legislation with a minimum of political pushback.
In the nineteenth century, a political movement led to the adoption of home
rule reforms. In the twentieth, a political movement agitated for a national
urban policy. But these efforts did not protect or ensure city power—the
hydraulic forces of centralization and privatization have simply been too
strong. Those forces are unlikely to abate soon.
The American city’s weakness is not just a function of impersonal social
and economic forces, however. Its weakness is also a function of an ideology
of American-style municipal boosterism that infects every aspect of the
center-periphery relationship. For the booster, cities are market actors and
municipal citizens are shoppers in a market for location. A city’s economic
success is proof of a city’s good leadership. Economic decline is proof of a
city’s failure to innovate. The American city continues to be defined by its
commercial success—something it has little control over—as opposed to its
fostering of a politics and economics of equals—something it in fact has
some capacity to advance.
Imaging a different city will take effort—both theoretical and practical.
The goal of such a reimagining is a richer account of democratic life—one
that can address a more profound political alienation. Providing cities with
home rule protections or with additional financial support can ameliorate
some of the material challenges that cities face, but not this deeper political
and economic malaise.

209. See STEVEN CONN, AMERICANS AGAINST THE CITY: ANTI-URBANISM
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Oxford Univ. Press eds., 2014).
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